CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the study
According to Gross, (2022) it's not simple to figure just how beneficial mediation is. Indeed, in certain circumstances of mediation, there is no obvious distinction between' success' and 'failure' (Gross, 2022), since such judgement are highly dependent on the conflict's temporal horizon. Effectiveness may be judged objectively ( the design of a peace deal, its quality, etc.) or subjectively ( the effectiveness of a peace agreement). Subjective measurements are based on people's opinions of their ability to achieve their goals (Gross, 2022). Addressing the subjective view points of the conflict parties helps to grasp their interpretations of a very complicated scenario in which 'objective' measures of success are strongly contested. Comparing the perspectives allows the researcher to see how divergent interpretations of the issue might stymie EU– Ukraine cooperation and impede conflict settlement (Merlingen,2019). Following a review of relevant international mediation literature, it has been zeroed in on four characteristics that are widely regarded as key predictors of mediation efficacy. Three of them are related to mediator qualities, while the fourth is related to mediator behavior. The february 2022 Russian and Ukrainian crisis presented Western nations to make clear their support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and its right to choose its security partnerships(Kartsonaki and Wolff, 2022). They have warned Russia that any military escalation will have significant economic consequences. Among measures being discussed are sanctions against Russia’s financial institutions, energy sector, and individuals close to the Kremlin(NEU, 2022). Russia’s controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Europe could be halted as part of any sanctions package. Military assistance from the UK, US, NATO and the EU is also being provided to Ukraine NEU(2022). The Normandy framework, which included Germany and France as mediators, provided proof of this. Mediation and diplomacy continues with several world leaders having visited Moscow for talks in recent weeks. At the time of writing, it is unclear whether the Kremlin will agree to NATO’s proposal for more substantive security talks in the longer term Poroshenko,(2022). A Russian response to the US’s counter proposals on legally binding security guarantees was received by the US administration on 17 February 2022 and is currently being considered NEU(2022). The European Union was perceived as a more concentrated player during Euromaidan (November 2013-February 2014). It was not only up to the European Commission, but also the European Parliament, to become involved. Later, a common stance on sanctions against Russia was developed (after lengthy talks and negotiating) as a result of the Russian Federation's participation in the Ukrainian issue (Poroshenko,2022). Even in the post-Soviet region, the EU is considered as a "honest mediator" who is welcomed to the negotiating table of conflict settlements. The situation in Ukraine is unique, as one cannot overlook the fact that the Russian, Ukrainian crisis was the first to be sparked by the country's ambition for active European integration NEU,(2022). As a result, the essential need of excellent mediation ,impartiality was more difficult to provide under these circumstances. The leverage of future European integration, for example, played a crucial part in the EU-mediated Kosovo-Serbia reconciliation in 2013. While this reasoning was ineffective in the Moldova-Transnistria conflict, it is much less effective in Ukraine NEU,(2022). One of the most crucial topics is what motivates the EU's engagement in conflict resolution. Is it motivated by human or European security imperatives, as Argyro Kartsonaki and Stefan Wolff in 2022 question in their article? In the sense of a norms-based strategy informed by the human security approach, and a utility-based policy that seeks stronger European security in the sense of greater security for the EU, its population, and member states (Kartsonaki and Wolff, 2022). It raises the issue of the European Union member states' incentive to participate in dispute resolution in various ways. On the one hand, the EU's normative approach and a basic principle of unification - no more war in Europe provides a pacifistic approach to settling problems in other countries that threaten democracy, human security, development, and collaboration in Europe (Poroshenko,2022). On the other hand, the purpose might be seen as one of safeguarding its own security, limiting spillover effects, bolstering national interests, and reducing the harmful impact of transnational threats. At the same time, it should be noted that the EU's incentive to become involved varies depending on how close the conflict is to its borders. The EU uses a human security strategy, although mostly as a tool, in regions where it also has the highest security interests (Kartsonaki and Wolff, 2022). As a result, the EU's aim in Europe is generally two fold: to defend its own security while also conveying a peaceful attitude and normative principles to others (Russia and Ukraine).