CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
The search for knowledge that is both absolute and certain has been continuous. However, since at least the time of Aristotle, there has been a strong epistemological tradition based mainly on human experience, which is not directed towards the possibility of achieving absolute knowledge.
This tradition is a typical example of the doctrine of empiricism. Empiricists argue that it is unreasonable to set a goal of absolute and all-inclusive knowledge, especially when there is close at hand the power to increase practical knowledge by slower but dependable methods.
Empiricist are content in building a system of knowledge that has a high probability of being true even though it’s absolute certainty cannot be guaranteed.
David Hume is one of the greatest empiricists in the history of epistemology and metaphysics who has distinguished himself as a consistent and coherent radical empiricist.
According to him, the only true knowledge is experimental, and any concept that is not available to sense perception is mere fanciful thinking.
The only abstract objects of the abstract science or of demonstration are quantity and number, and all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion.1
With an ideological ferocity, he calls for a book-burning campaign of any metaphysical work.
He proclaims:
When we run over libraries persuaded of these (empirical) principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume: of or school metaphysics, for instance lets ask does it contain any abstract reasoning containing quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter-of-fact and existence? No. Commit to it to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.2
Hume’s proposal of vigorous sensism as an alternative to our natural and acquired scientific, metaphysical and socio-cultural deposits, creates more problems than it resolves. It withers all foundation of science and philosophy. It leaves us in make-shift, sandy subjectivism of dry empiricism.
David Hume’s empiricism within the context of knowledge is great, but a consistent empirist will end up destroying the very foundation of knowledge. The epistemological, scientific and ontological heritage of humanity is we think more than a series of impressions.3 To reduce them as bundles of impressions. To reduce them as bundles of impressions as Hume would want to believe is myopic.
The above as a way of introduction forms the background of our study.