CHAPTER ONE
1.0  THEORIES OF TRUTH
My essay centers especially on the epistemological conviction of Kwasi Wiredu with regards problem of truth.                                                                                                                                        My intention in this essay is to critically evaluate all the strands of Wiredu’s argument in support of his thesis that there is nothing called truth that is different from opinion. I contend that in arguing that truth is nothing but mere opinion, Wiredu fails in denying truth of its objective characters. I also submit that Wiredu fail in making truth subjective. This is inspite of his avowed attempts at clarifying the senses in which he uses such concepts as “Truth” and ‘opinion’.
  Consequently, this essay has been divided into four chapters in order that I will be better placed to understand the background to Wiredu’s position and also his main thesis.
          In chapter one, I shall discuss generally the notion of truth in traditional western epistemology. In this chapter, I shall try to briefly analyze the basic proposition of the main objectivistic theories of truth, that is the semantic and the correspondence theories of truth and also examine the two non objectivistic theories of truth namely, the coherence and the pragmatic theories of truth. And as we shall discover Wiredu’s position is neither wholly pragmatic nor wholly coherent. He simply affirms both theories to some extent. As we shall see in this chapter that Wiredu believe that truth is coherence, also following Deweyian pragmatic principles Wiredu asserts that truth is “Warranted assertibility “.
          In chapter two, I shall discuss in detail Wiredu’s thesis on trut h to the effect that to be true is simply to be opined. Prior to this would be consideration of his formal critique of the correspondence theory of truth, which is the most forceful representation of all objectivistic theories of truth. I shall discuss also his general thesis, which states that  “To be is to be known”.
          In the third chapter, I shall begin by presenting the critique that have been  levelled against Wiredu’s position by three  contemporary  African  philosophers, Joseph Omoregbe, P.O Bodunrin, and Abdu Ghaniyi Bello, I shall then  consider Wiredu’s replies to some of the critics.
 In evaluating this essay, I will, in chapter four, point out and critically analyze the flaws which I believe in Wiredu’s system, and then proceed to show my own conviction s on how truth is to be conceived and treated.
1.1     THE NATURE AND TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF TRUTH
          The word “Truth” has its equivalence on the Greek word “Alenthia” and the Latin word “Veritas”, meaning in general some kind of agreement between thought and its objects, between knowledge and that which is known.
          In its most simple form truth means the accordance of conformity between what is asserted and what is. According to Aristotle Truth is primary in judgment. A true judgment is true when it attributes a predicate to or denies it of a subject according to what reality it demands.1
          A true account of the nature of truth can be given in terms of the condition under which a statement is said to be true or false. However, the same cannot be done for persons: truth in this case is a derivative sense of truth. Moreover, truth and false hood are not proper candidates for sentences as such, in other words, until a statement is used to state that something is or not the case it is not a candidate for truth. Thus, it is to statements that truth and falsity are attributable, and invariably to beliefs of which these statements may be the expression2.
          Given that a statement is true. The following questions, at least, can be raised: what do we mean we say that a statement is true? Are we attributing a property?  What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for its truth, that is, it is true if and only if what? These questions are the ones that may be raised concerning any statement whatever, are all possible candidates for what is meant by the general question “What is truth”?
          Truth can be rightly viewed as a consequential property of statement. That is to say that it might be a property that statements in virtue of the fact that other posses in virtue of the fact that other things are true of them3. In that’s case, the philosophy of truth should decide what these other things are, that are necessary concerning a statement if it is to be true.
All this has some sort of bearing with the correspondence theory of truth.
          However, apart from this theory other various theories have been advocated. The absolute idealist put forward a coherence theory of truth in which the only absolute truth is “The whole” and anything less than the whole can only aspire to degrees of truth. Here knowledge is confirmed by validation procedures4.
          Williams James argued for a “pragmatic theory of truth” according to which the problem of truth is one of the welfare economic, for a true assertion is one proves the best in the long.
          Tarski attempted to avoid the problems of self – references by claiming that truth can only be defined in a meta language, there by bringing into being the “Semantic theory of truth”.
          F.P Ramsey thought that he had dissolved the problem truth by pointing out that ‘P’ and  'P' is true means the same thing and therefore, that is true” is redundant; hence the redundancy theory of truth for now”, the main objectivistic theory of truth, mainly the semantic and correspondence theories shall be discussed in detail.